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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
(1) Did the search and seizure of the Appellant's property 
violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure? 
(a) Did the affidavit and the search 
warrant provide facts sufficient to establish 
probable cause? 
(b) Was the unlawful search and seizure 
substantial and in bad faith, and did the trial 
court err in refusing to suppress the evidence 
seized? 
(c) Was the appellant prejudiced by the 
admission of the illegally seized evidence? 
(d) Did the search and seizure violate 
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of 
Utah? 
(e) If the warrant stated sufficient facts 
to find probable cause, did the trial court err 
in refusing to suppress individual items not 
listed on the warrant as items to be seized? 
(2) Had the illegally seized property been suppressed, 
would the evidence presented have been sufficient to support a 
verdict of guilt? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. : 
WILLIAM H. BABBELL, : Case No. 21033 
: Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, William Babbell, appeals from a conviction 
and judgment imposed for two counts of Aggravated Sexual Assault, 
felonies of the first degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-405 (1953 as amended), and one count of Aggravated Kidnapping, 
a felony of the first degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-302 (1953 as amended). Trial was held in Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding on October 28-30, 1985. 
The Appellant was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 
incarceration, each for from five years to life. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, William Babbell, was convicted of two counts 
of Aggravated Sexual Assault and one count of Aggravated Kidnapping, 
all arising from one criminal episode. The evidence at trial 
established that in the early morning hours of April 18, 1985, Karen 
Sine (Fletcher), after having a fight with her husband, went to Big 
Cottonwood Canyon to roast hotdogs and drink beer with three friends 
(T. 101-105). After a few hours, at approximately 4:00 a.m. the 
group was approached by a man who had driven up in a 
four-wheel-drive pickup truck (T. 106-107). The man told the group 
that he was a police officer and that they would have to leave the 
canyon (T. 107-108). He claimed that, because Karen Sine was in the 
canyon late at night and was under the age of twenty-one without any 
local identification, he would have to personally escort her out of 
the canyon (T. 109-110). The man drove her out of the canyon but 
instead of meeting her friends at the mouth of the canyon, he 
continued driving and, after stopping at a convenience store, 
proceeded to a secluded spot in a different canyon where he put a 
knife to her throat and sexually assaulted her (T. 106-124). A 
second sexual assault occurred after Ms. Sine was driven to an area 
near Corner Canyon in southeast Salt Lake County. Ms. Sine was 
released after several hours (T. 125-126). From Corner Canyon she 
walked toward Salt Lake City and subsequently called her husband 
from a convenience store at approximately 8:30 a.m. (T. 182). 
The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department assigned 
detective Larry Cazier to investigate the offense. Several 
witnesses and the victim described the four wheel drive truck they 
had seen as having spotlights and having a stock appearance, without 
chrome wheels (T. 176, 198-99, 241). The appellant's truck, as 
evidence by photographs admitted at trial, does not have spotlights 
(T. 131) and is raised and has chrome wheels (T. 240-241). The 
color of the truck (brown) and the fact that it does not have 
bumpers (a common feature on four wheel drive pick-ups), were the 
only matching characteristics (Addendum A). 
Ms. Sine described her assailant to Detective Cazier as 
being 5fll" (T. 154), having dark black hair (T. 154), straight 
bottom teeth (T. 156), and as having no moustache (T. 160). The 
appellant, William Babbell, is 6 '3", has brown hair and a moustache, 
and a front lower tooth missing (T. 157), that tooth having been 
missing prior to the assault of Ms. Sine. Mr. Babbell has tatoos on 
his hand and both upper legs which are large and noticeable (T. 
293), but which Ms. Sine had never described her assailant as having 
(T. 152). Mr. Babbell had these tatoos for a long time preceding 
trial (T. 293-94). 
The defendant presented an alibi defense, based on the 
time-table of events established by Ms. Sine's testimony. Ms. Sine 
testified that she went with her friends to a canyon picnic spot at 
1:30 a.m. (T. 180). Sometime between 3:30 to 4:00 a.m. her 
assailant drove up and Ms. Sine was abducted (J^ 3.). Ms. Sine was 
with her assailant until he left her at 7:00 a.m., at which time she 
started to walk towards the Salt Lake City area (T. 181). She was 
certain that the time was 7:00 a.m. because it was light when she 
started to walk down the canyon (T. 182). Ms. Sine called her 
husband at 8:30 a.m. (Ld.). Florence Babbell, the appellant's 
mother, testified that on April 17, the evening before the early 
morning assault of Karen Sine, William Babbell left the house, but 
returned shortly after midnight (T. 301). After returning home, 
William drank coffee and talked to his parents who were caring for a 
sick baby nephew (T. 302). After chatting for approximately 1 1/2 
hours, William went to bed (T. 302). William's truck was in the 
driveway where he had parked it when Mrs. Babbell woke up the next 
morning at 6:00 a.m. (T. 302). Mrs. Babbell went out to the camper 
where William slept and woke him sometime between 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. 
so that he could drive to his sister's house (T. 303). The 
defendant argued that he could not have been in the canyon with 
Karen Sine at 7:00 a.m. because his mother woke him up at home 
between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. 
Sometime between April 19, 1985 and April 22, 1985, 
Detective Cazier had a conversation with another detective from the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Virgil Johnson, and was given the 
name of the defendant whose "description and modus operandi" 
apparently fit that of Ms. Sine's assailant. A search of motor 
vehicle records determined defendant did own a truck (T. 37). His 
address was apparently determined through these records and the 
first of three visits to the defendant's home on April 22, 1985 was 
conducted by Cazier and Johnson (T. 33-35). However, despite now 
having the name of a possible suspect, no photo-spread containing 
the defendant's picture was shown to the victim or the other three 
witnesses until April 23, 1985 (T. 50). Thus, there was no 
corroboration for any of Johnson's statements prior to the visits to 
defendant's home. 
According to the testimony of defendant's mother, Mrs. 
Florence Babbell, at defendant's Suppression Hearing, two men 
identifying themselves only as "friends of Bill's" came to her home 
on the morning of April 22, 1985 asking for her son William (T. 
11-12). When told by Mrs. Babbell her son was not home but was 
expected later in the day, the men left (T. 12). During a second 
visit some hours later, the men returned, this time identifying 
themselves as police officers who told Mrs. Babbell her son had 
committed the offenses against Ms. Sine and "told me my son was 
armed and dangerous and that, if necessary, would be shot and 
questions asked later." (T. 15-16). Detective Cazier, in his 
testimony, confirmed he recalled some conversation regarding a gun 
but could recall no specifics (T. 40). The men asked to see the 
defendant's truck which was parked in the driveway. Mrs. Babbell 
refused to allow them entry into the truck without showing a 
warrant. No warrant was produced, but the officers did look into 
the interior of the truck (T. 39). 
Some time after the second visit, Detective Cazier prepared 
and submitted for issuance to Fifth Circuit Judge Mike Burton a 
warrant with supporting affidavit. Judge Burton issued the search 
warrant (Addendum A). At approximately 5:00 p.m. the two deputies 
as well as other Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department personnel 
returned to the Babbell residence and searched the camper, house and 
jeep of Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Babbell as well as defendant William 
Babbell's truck. A copy of a search warrant along with a list of 
items seized was left with Tina Jacobson, defendant's sister, who 
was the only one home at the time the search was conducted (T. 21). 
The appellant filed a timely motion to suppress the 
evidence seized in the search (R. 18-19) (Addendum B). A hearing 
was held September 19, 1985 and oral arguments were heard October 8, 
1985, The prosecutor stipulated to the suppression of several items 
seized which were not listed on the warrant nor on the affidavit (T. 
69-70). But, defense counsel argued that the warrant and affidavit 
were facially invalid and, therefore, everything seized should be 
suppressed (T. 77-75). Judge Daniels denied the motion (R. 38 ) 
(Addendum C) . 
On October 30, 1985, William Babbel was convicted of two 
counts of aggravated sexual assault and one count of aggravated 
kidnapping. He was acquitted of one count of aggravated robbery (T. 
367). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The first argument presented on appeal is that the search 
and seizure of the Appellant's property violated both his Fourth 
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his 
Article I Section 12 rights under the Constitution of Utah. Neither 
the affidavit nor the search warrant stated facts sufficient to 
establish probable cause for a search. Instead both were vague, 
general, and relied on the uncorroborated statements of a 
non-affiant. The search and seizure was substantial and in bad 
faith, as evidenced by one officerfs threats to Appellantfs mother 
and his seizing many items not listed on the face of the warrant or 
affidavit. The admission of the illegally seized items prejudiced 
the appellant at trial. If the search and seizure did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as 
restrictively interpreted by the Supreme Court, it violated Article 
I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. This Court is free to 
interpret the Utah Constitution as being more protective than the 
federal constitution. Appellant also contends that the trial court, 
which suppressed many items seized but not listed on the face of the 
affidavit, erred in not suppressing all such items. 
Finally, the Appellant contends that had the illegally 
seized evidence been suppressed, the evidence presented would have 
been insufficient to support a guilty verdict. Given the many 
significant inconsistencies in the appearance of the Appellant as 
compared to the victimfs descriptions of her assailant, as well as 
the Appellant's alibi defense, the jury could not have reasonably 




THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF APPELLANT'S PROPERTY 
VIOLATED HIS FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE FREE 
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
The appellant was convicted of the April 18, 1985 
aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault of Karen Sine. 
Sometime between April 19, 1985 and April 22, 1985, 
Detective Cazier had a conversation with another detective from the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Virgil Johnson, and was given the 
name of the defendant whose "description and modus operandi" 
apparently fit that of Ms. Sine's assailant. A search of motor 
vehicle records determined defendant did own a truck. His address 
was apparently determined through these records and the first of 
three visits to the defendant's home on April 22, 1985 was conducted 
by Cazier and Johnson. However, despite now having the name of a 
possible suspect, no photo-spread containing the defendant's picture 
was shown to the victim or the other three witnesses until April 23, 
1985. In addition, Cazier admitted at a hearing on defendant's 
Motion to Suppress that he had personally never seen the defendant 
nor defendant's truck. Thus, there was no corroboration for any of 
Johnson's statements despite the lack of corroboration. 
Detective Cazier prepared and submitted for issuance to 
Fifth Circuit Judge Mike Burton a warrant with supporting 
affidavit. Judge Burton issued the search warrant. At 
approximately 5:00 p.m. the two deputies as well as other Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Department personnel returned to the Babbell 
residence and searched the camper, house and jeep of Mr. and Mrs. 
Herbert Babbell as well as defendant William Babbell's truck. A 
copy of a search warrant along with a list of items seized was left 
with Tina Jacobson, defendant's sister, who was the only one home at 
the time the search was conducted (Addendum A). 
The Appellant filed a timely motion to suppress the 
evidence seized in the search. The prosecutor stipulated to the 
suppression of several items seized which were not listed on the 
warrant nor on the affidavit of probable cause (T. 69-70). The 
appellant further argued to the Court that all of the items seized 
should be suppressed because neither the affidavit nor the search 
warrant complied with statutory requirements or stated sufficient 
facts upon which a magistrate could make an independent probable 
cause determination (T. 73-75). Judge Daniels ruled against the 
appellant, refusing to suppress the remaining items (T. 81). 
A. BOTH THE AFFIDAVIT AND THE SUBSEQUENT SEARCH 
WARRANT FAILED TO STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A SEARCH WARRANT. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment [Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)], provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Similarly, Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or things to be seized. 
The United States Supreme Court has elaborated on the 
importance of a finding of probable cause by an independent, neutral 
magistrate before issuance of a warrant in several cases. In 
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), a warrant was issued 
upon the sworn allegation that the affiant "has cause to suspect and 
does believe" that certain merchandise was in a specified location. 
The Court, noting that the affidavit "went upon a mere affirmation 
of suspicion and belief without any statement of adequate supporting 
facts," announced the following rule: 
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer [of the 
court] may not properly issue a warrant to search 
a private dwelling unless he can find probable 
cause therefore from facts or circumstances 
presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere 
affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough. 
Id., at 47. 
Similarly, in Giordenello v United States, 357 U.S. 480 
(1958), the Supreme Court announced that: 
"the inferences from the facts which lead to the 
complaint [must] be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by 
the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime . . . . The 
purpose of the complaint, then, is to enable the 
appropriate magistrate to determine whether the 
probable cause required to support a warrant 
exists. The Commissioner must judge for himself 
the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a 
complaining officer to show probable cause. He 
should not accept without question the 
complainant's mere conclusion." 
Id., at 486. Because that warrant stated only conclusions of the 
affiant and no objective facts, the Giordenello Court overturned the 
appellant's conviction. 
In State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 178 (Utah 1983), this 
Court reiterated the importance of an independent probable cause 
decision by a neutral magistrate, stating: 
The intervention of a neutral magistrate not only 
guarantees a lawful search of a suspected 
offender, but in a larger sense it protects 
society against the erosion of those cherished 
rights that are still not taken for granted in 
many parts of the world. Courts do not enforce 
these procedural requirements to sanction the 
activities of one single individual, but to 
assure all citizens those continuing fundamental 
rights. 
The United States Supreme Court stated in Aguilar v. Texas, 
378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964): 
Although the reviewing court will pay substantial 
deference to judicial determinations of probable 
cause, the court must still insist that the 
magistrate perform his "neutral and detached" 
function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp 
for the police. 
Regarding the information which must be contained in an affidavit, 
the court stated: 
[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the 
underlying circumstances from which the informant 
concluded that the [seizable items] were where he 
claimed they were, and some of the underlying 
circumstances from which the officer concluded 
that the information . . . was credible or his 
information reliable. Ld., at 114-15. 
Aguilar, combined with the later case of Spinelli v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969), established a two-prong test to 
determine the adequacy of information contained in an affidavit. 
Under the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, the magistrate must be apprised 
of the following: 
(1) The underlying facts or circumstances from which the 
affiant could conclude that the informant was reliable or his 
information credible; and 
(2) The underlying facts or circumstances from which the 
informant concluded that criminal activity was being carried on, or 
the goods to be seized are where they are purported to be. 
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Supreme 
Court held that strict compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli standard 
is not absolutely required so long as the "totality of the 
circumstances" demonstrate probable cause. Yet this Court, as well 
as many other courts, continues to recognize the Aguilar-Spinelli 
standard as an important guideline concerning issues of probable 
cause. In State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984), this 
Court stated: 
[E]ven under [the totality of the circumstances] 
standard, compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli 
guidelines may be necessary to make a sufficient 
basis for probable cause. Depending on the 
circumstances, a showing of the basis of 
knowledge and veracity or reliability of the 
person providing the information for a warrant 
may well be necessary to establish with a "fair 
probability" that the evidence sought actually 
exists and can be found where the informant 
states. 
The Utah requirements for search warrants are listed in 
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-2 and 3 (1953 as amended): 
77-23-2. Grounds for issuance. Property or 
evidence may be seized pursuant to a search 
warrant if there is probable cause to believe 
that it: 
(1) Was unalwfully acquired or is 
unlawfully possessed; 
(2) Has been used or is possessed for the 
purpose of being used to commit or conceal the 
commission of an offense; or 
(3) Is evidence of illegal conduct. 
77-23-3. Conditions precedent to issuance. (1) 
A search warrant shall not issue except upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation 
particularly describing the person or place to be 
searched and the person, property or evidence to 
be seized. 
In the present case, the Appellant, William Babbell, 
contends that neither the search warrant nor the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant complied with the Aguilar-Spinelli 
guideline or the Utah statute and that, under the totality of the 
circumstances, neither the warrant nor the affidavit provided 
sufficient probable cause to search Mr. Babbell's residence. In 
granting the search warrant without an adequate statement of 
probable cause, Judge Burton failed to carry out his 
responsibilities as an independent and neutral magistrate as 
required by §77-23-1 (1953 as amended). 
The only paragraph in the "Affidavit for Search Warrant" 
(Addendum A) attested to by Detective Cazier and presented to Judge 
Burton that could be construed as linking William Babbell to the 
crimes alleged was based on unsupported information from a third 
person, not the affiant and stated: 
Based on the modus operadi of the suspect and the 
description of the suspect, Detective Virgil 
Johnson, Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, 
believed the vehicle may belong to William 
Babbell. The detectives drove by the address of 
the suspect, 8558 South 3830 West, and noticed a 
truck in the driveway that matched the 
description. The suspect's mother, a resident at 
the address, gave the detectives permission to 
look at the truck. 
This clause is woefully inadequate to enable a neutral magistrate to 
find probable cause. It states merely that a truck similar to that 
described by witnesses was in the driveway of Mr. Babbell's 
residence. No other facts implicating Mr. Babbell are given. 
The affidavit vaguely alludes to a third person's (Officer 
Virgil Johnson) knowledge of Mr. Babbell's "modus operadi" [sic], 
but does not give any foundational information for such knowledge. 
It does not state when, if at all, officer Johnson had past 
experience with Mr. Babbell. Even more basically, the affidavit 
fails to provide any information that Mr. Babbell had ever done any 
similar acts in the past from which to establish a "modus 
operandi." Clearly the statement with respect to Johnson's 
knowledge is vague, uncorroborated and lacking in even the most 
basic foundational facts necessary to enable a judge to make an 
objective and detached assessment of probable cause. Such vague and 
uncorroborated assertions based on mere conclusions of an officer 
were clearly condemned by the Supreme Court in Whitely v. Warden, 
401 U.S. 560 (1971) . 
The affidavit does not say how the truck matched earlier 
descriptions nor more importantly, the ways in which the truck did 
not match earlier descriptions. In fact, witnesses described the 
truck they had seen as having spotlights, and having a stock 
appearance, without chrome wheels. Ms. Sine reported that the 
windshield was cracked (T. 198-99, 241, 176). The Appellant's truck 
did not have spotlights, and it was raised with chrome wheels. No 
evidence of defendant's truck having a cracked windshield was 
introduced at trial. The color of the truck and the fact that it 
did not have bumpers (a common feature of four wheel drive pickups) 
were the only matching characteristics that could be listed in the 
affidavit. 
A magistrate could not substantiate this statement given 
the facts provided in the affidavit. 
In conclusion, no facts or circumstances justifying 
suspicion of Mr. Babbell were presented in the affidavit for the 
warrant. If Judge Burton was justified in granting the warrant to 
search Mr. Babbell's residence based on the facts provided in the 
affidavit, he would have been justified in issuing a warrant to 
search any particular residence with a brown four wheel drive 
pick-up truck in the driveway. The warrant was not particularized. 
It amounted to little more than a "general" warrant — forbidden by 
the Fourth Amendment. Without foundational facts, the inconclusive 
statement that officer Johnson recognized the "modus operandi" of 
Mr. Babbell completely lacked substantiation and served as no 
credible, reliable information. The judge could not have made a 
neutral, independent probable cause finding based on the facts 
provided to him. 
B. THE UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS SUBSTANTIAL 
AND IN BAD FAITH, AND THEREFORE THE COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE SO SEIZED. 
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the federal exclusionary rule announced in 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), also applied to state 
criminal proceedings. The Court stated: 
Today we . . . close the only courtroom door 
remaining open to evidence secured by official 
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic 
right, reserved to all persons as a specific 
guarantee against that very same unlawful 
conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by 
searches and seizures in violation of the 
constitution is, by that same authority, 
inadmissible in a state court. (Emphasis 
added). 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 654-55. In so holding, the Court not 
only recognized the deterent value of the exclusionary rule, but it 
also emphasized the importance in maintaining judicial integrity, 
stating: 
The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the 
law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a 
government more quickly than its failure to 
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of 
the charter of its own existence . . . . As Mr. 
Justice Brandeis said . . . "Our government is 
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or 
for ill, it teaches the whole people by its 
example . . . . If the government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it 
invites every man to become a law into himself; 
it invites anarchy." (Citations omitted). 
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659. 
Under the exclusionary rule, illegally seized evidence 
cannot be directly or indirectly used in a criminal trial against 
the victim of the illegal serach. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 
62 (1954), Wong Son v. United States, 347 U.S. 485 (1963). In 
United States v. Houtin, 566 F.2d 1027 (Fifth Cir. 1978), the court 
summarized: 
Although excluded evidence often times is quite 
reliable and "the most probative information 
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant," the [exclusionary] rule's 
prohibition applies to direct evidence as well as 
to 'fruit of the poinsonous tree' —secondary 
evidence derived from the illegally seized 
evidence itself. 
In the recent case of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. , 
82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), the United States Supreme Court opened, on 
a limited basis, the judicial door which it had sought to close in 
Mapp, supra. Relying entirely on the deterence justification for 
the exclusionary rule, and ignoring the judicial integrity 
justification, the court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule does not bar the prosecutor's use of evidence obtained by 
officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately 
found to be unsupported by probable cause. But the Court was 
careful to emphasize that: 
Suppression . . . remains an appropriate remedy 
if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant 
was mislead by information in an affidavit that 
the affiant knew was false or would have known 
was false except for his reckless disregard of 
the truth. The exception we recognize today will 
also not apply in cases where the issuing 
magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role 
. . . . Nor would an officer manifest objective 
good faith in relying on a warrant based on an 
affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable." Finally, 
depending on the circumstances of the particular 
case, a warrant may be so facially deficient 
. . . that the executing officers cannot 
reasonably presume it to be valid. 
Leon, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 698-99. In so stating, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that unreasonable actions by the police in obtaining the 
search warrant are grounds for suppressing the evidence. 
In 1982, the Utah State Legislature established its own 
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. Utah Code Ann. 
§77-23-12 states: 
Evidence seized pursuant to warrant not excluded 
unless unlawful search or seizure substantial — 
"Substantial" defined. Pursuant to the standards 
described in section 77-35-12(g) property or 
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant 
shall not be suppressed at a motion, trial, or 
other proceeding unless the unlawful conduct of 
the peace officer is shown to be substantial. 
Any unlawful search or seizure shall be 
considered substantial and in bad faith if the 
warrant was obtained with malicious purpose and 
without probable cause or was executed 
maliciously and wilfully beyond the authority of 
the warrant or with unnecessary severity. 
In the present case the Appellant, William Babbell, contends that 
the evidence presented at the suppression hearing demonstrates 
Officer Cazier's bad faith and maliciousness in procurring the 
warrant, which was fatally lacking in probable cause (Point A, 
above). Therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to suppress 
all of the evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant. 
Mr. Babbell's mother, Mrs. Florence Babbell, testified at 
the suppression hearing that, on the morning of April 22, 1985, two 
men, identifying themselves only as "friends of Bill's," came to her 
home asking for her son William (T. 11-12). She had never seen 
these men before. Mrs. Babbell told them that Bill was not home and 
she did not know when he would return (T. 12). They then left (T. 
13). The men never told Mrs. Babbell that they were police 
officers, nor why they wanted to talk to Bill. A few hours later 
both men returned, identified themselves as police officers, and 
showed Mrs. Babbell an arrest warrant they had for Mr. Babbell. 
Mrs. Babbell testified: 
I told him [Officer Larry Cazier] I read it. I 
said, "I want to read it," and I read the arrest 
warrant. And he [Officer Cazier] said, "He's 
armed and he's dangerous," and he said, "If I see 
him, I'll shoot and I'll ask questions later." 
And I said, "This is my son you're talking 
about." And he said, "Well, that's the way it 
is." (T. 15-16) 
Detective Cazier testified that he recalled some conversation 
regarding a gun, but could not recall the specifics (T. 39-40). He 
said he indicated to Mrs. Babbell that they considered William to be 
a "forcible fellow" and that force in his apprehension would be 
justified (T. 40). Officer Cazier testified that he and his 
partner, on this second visit to Mr. Babbell's residence then looked 
into the defendant's pick-up truck without a warrant, after 
obtaining the "consent" of Mrs. Babbell (T. 39). 
Only after this second visit to the Babbell residence did 
Officer Crazier prepare and submit a search warrant and supporting 
affidavit to Fifth Circuit Court Judge Mike Burton. Judge Burton 
issued the search warrant. At approximately 5:00 p.m. the two 
deputies, as well as other sheriff's department personnel, returned 
to the Babbell residence and searched the camper, house, and jeep of 
Mr. and Mrs. Babbell, as well as the appellant's truck (T. 55). A 
copy of the search warrant along with a list of items seized was 
left with Tina Jacobson, the Appellant's sister, who was the only 
one home at the time the search was conducted (Addendum A). 
These facts, leading up to the subsequent search, 
demonstrate the capriciousness and bad faith of Officers Cazier and 
Virgil Johnson. Officer Cazier could not view the interior of 
William Babbell's truck from the street. The first two visits he 
had no warrant, nor did he have probable cause to secure one. 
Cazier entered the Babbell property without permission using the 
pretense that he was a friend of William Babbell. When told William 
Babbell was not at home, Cazier left. He later returned to the 
Babbell home, again without benefit of a warrant or probable cause 
to secure one. This second time Cazier identified himself as a 
police officer and proceeded to intimidate the elderly Mrs. Babbell, 
telling her that her son would be shot on sight and questions asked 
later. After this intimidation, Mrs. Babbell gave the officer 
permission to look into the Appellant's truck. Officer Cazier then 
inspected the interior of the truck, although he did not enter the 
truck. These strong-arm tactics by officer Cazier were utterly 
unacceptable conduct for a police officer and demonstrate objective 
bad faith. Only after terrorizing Mrs. Babbell into involuntarily 
granting the officer permission to look into the truck was officer 
Cazier able to secure a search warrant. 
Officer Cazier's bad faith was also evidenced by his search 
of the Babbell residence. The affidavit and search warrant listed 
six items to be seized (Addendum A). Of these six items, only two 
items matching the general descriptions listed were seized. But 
Officer Cazier seized an additional fourteen items not listed on the 
warrant (Addendum A). Several of these items were supressed at 
trial, but at least two prejudicial non-listed items were not 
suppressed, a red flashlight and a "55 mph sucks" button (T. 42). 
Neither item was described in police reports as having been reported 
by Ms. Sine as belonging to her assailant. This large scale, 
knowing violation of the limits of the search warrant demonstrated, 
again, Officer Cazier's bad faith. 
In conclusion, the type of police misconduct exhibited in 
this case is precisely that which the exclusionary rule is meant to 
deter. The evidence should have been suppressed since it was 
obtained in bad faith. 
C. THE ADMISSION OF ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE 
VIOLATED ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH. 
The Appellant, William Babbell, contends that even if the 
search and seizure of his residence and family vehicles did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it 
did violate Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. There 
have been recurring reminders in recent cases that this Court 
remains free to interpret the Utah Constitutional requirements 
regarding search and seizure and to impose higher standards on 
searches and seizures under the Utah Constitution than are required 
by the federal constitution. (See, for example, State v. Hygh, 711 
P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, dissenting) and State v. Earl, 30 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 21, 1986). 
A state is free, as a matter of its own law, to impose 
greater restrictions on police activity than those which the United 
States Supreme Court has held are necessary under federal 
constitutional standards. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 
U.S. 74 (1980), Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Brennan, State 
Consitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. 
Rev. 489 (1977). An increasing member of state courts are analyzing 
state constitutional search and seizure provisions to expand 
constitutional protection beyond those mandated by the Fourth 
Amendment, often directly avoiding United States Supreme Court 
precedent. See, for example, State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 
P.2d 942, 947 (Or. 1982) and cases cited therein. Not only have 
state courts made independent decisions in the first instance, 
sometimes they have declined to follow the United States Supreme 
Court's analysis on remand after that Court reversed the state 
court's fourth amendment analysis, as did South Dakota in the remand 
of South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) and Massachusetts 
in the remand of Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S. , 82 L.Ed. 
2d 737 (1984), the comparison case of Leon, supra. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that suppression 
at trial of illegally seized evidence JL_S constitutionally mandated: 
We hold that all evidence obtained by searches 
and seizures in violation of the constitution is, 
by that same authority, inadmissible in a state 
court. 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). That court also mandated a 
two prong analysis for determining the sufficiency of a probable 
cause statement in the Aguilar-Spinelli line of cases. However, the 
Burger Court, under the doctrine of "new federalism", has rolled 
back many federal Fourth Amendment protections established in the 
earlier Warren Court. In Leon, supra, the Burger court, ignoring 
the judicial integrity justification for the exclusionary rule which 
is so vital in Mapp, held that deterence of inappropriate conduct of 
police officials was the sole reason for the exclusionary rule. 
Therefore, only knowing violations of the Fourth Amendment by police 
officers would be grounds to exclude evidence. In so holding, the 
Leon court went against the express wording of Mapp, finding that 
suppression is not a constitutionally based remedy. Similarly, the 
Burger Court retracted protections established by the Warren Court 
when it substituted its vague concept of probable cause "under the 
totality of the circumstances", a standard without any guidelines 
whatsoever, for the Warren Court's Aguilar-Spinelli test of probable 
cause, in Illinois v. Gates, supra. The effect of the "good faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule and the "totality of the 
circumstances" standard for probable cause is to impose an almost 
insurmountable burden on an Appellant to demonstrate that probable 
cause was lacking and, if he manages to meet that burden, to 
demonstrate that an officer acted in bad faith and therefore the 
evidence should be excluded. The Burger Court has, in effect, 
highly limited the Fourth Amendment as a viable remedy for 
Appellants who have suffered what would have been, 15 years ago, a 
clear cut violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
In the present case the Appellant respectfully requests 
that this Court adopt the articulate and well-reasoned approaches of 
Aguilar-Spinelli and the two prong standard for probable cause 
statements announced therein, for purposes of Article I Section 14 
of the Constitution of Utah. Similarly, the appellant requests that 
this Court follow the United States Supreme Court in Mapp, supra, in 
holding that, once a violation of Article I Section 14 is 
established, the Utah Constitution requires that the tainted 
evidence be excluded from evidence without a showing of "bad faith" 
on the part of the police officers involved. In so stating, this 
Court would let the public know that Utah courts will not be a party 
to, and take advantage of, illegally seized evidence. The result of 
such a rule can only be a more thorough and accurate investigation 
by police and a more careful examination of warrant requests by 
magistrates. In so holding, this Court would join the growing ranks 
of state supreme courts which offer greater constitutional 
protection under state constitutions than the Burger Court chooses 
to allow under the Federal Constitution. See the voluminous 
citations in State v. Caraher, supra. 
The appellant concludes that, following the 
Aguilar-Spinelli two prong standard of probable cause, the warrant 
and affidavit were constitutionally deficient of probable cause (See 
Point I A, above). Therefore, the search and seizure violated 
Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. Because Utah 
courts should not be tarnished by becoming a party to illegally 
seized evidence, the Constitution of Utah should require suppression 
of such illegally seized evidence, as the Federal Constitution once 
did. 
D. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE WARRANT STATED FACTS 
SUFFICIENT TO SHOW PROBABLE CAUSE, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS INDIVIDUAL 
ITEMS NOT LISTED ON THE WARRANT. 
In this case the trial court refused to find the search 
warrant facially invalid, rejecting the Appellant's argument that 
the warrant lacked facts sufficient to show probable cause (T. 81). 
But the affidavit and search warrant listed only six items to be 
seized (Addendum A). Officer Cazier, in addition seizing two of the 
six items listed, also seized fourteen items not listed on the 
warrant nor affidavit as items to be seized (Addendum A, T. 69-70). 
The trial court suppressed many of these items before trial, but two 
prejudicial non-listed items were not suppressed, a red flashlight 
and a "55 mph sucks" button (T. 42). Neither item was described in 
police reports as having been reported by the victim as belonging to 
her assailant (T. 42-43). The appellant contends that the trial 
court erred in refusing to suppress these two items which were not 
listed as items to be seized. 
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah require that a 
warrant contain an oath or affirmation "particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The 
United States Supreme Court, in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 
192 (1927), explained, "The requirement that warrants shall 
particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches 
under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a 
warrant describing another." The Marron court emphasized two 
important purposes underlying the particularity requirement: 
preventing general searches; and preventing the seizure of objects 
upon the mistaken assumption that they fall within authorization 
granted by the magistrate in the warrant. A third purpose of the 
particularity requirement is to prevent "the issuance of warrants on 
loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact." Bo-Bart Importing Co. v. 
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). 
An exception to the requirement that seized items be listed 
on the warrant is the plain view doctrine, which this Court 
addressed in State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207 (Ut. 1985). In 
Gallegos, this Court held that property which is not facially 
illegal (in that case, a video-cassette recorder) cannot be first 
seized and then investigated. The investigation should come before 
the seizure, and therefore the item should be listed as an item to 
be seized in the warrant. But where there was investigation and 
probable cause before the seizure and the item is inadvertently left 
off the warrant, the searching officer may seize the item if the 
officer sees it at a time when he is where he has a legal right to 
be. Id. at 209. 
In the present case, Officer Cazier seized a n55 mph sucks" 
and a red flashlight, neither of which were listed as items to be 
seized. Neither of these items appeared in any police report as 
being reported by the victim as belonging to her assailant (T. 
42-43). The "55 mph sucks" button was mentioned briefly in the 
affidavit's factual statement, but it is not listed as an item to be 
seized. Given the fact that Officer Cazier looked into the 
Appellant's truck before obtaining a warrant to search the truck, 
the button should not have been allowed under the plain view 
doctrine. Clearly, the affidavit's mention of the button is 
possibly not a product of prior investigation, but instead the 
result of intimidating Mrs. Babbell into letting him look into the 
truck (see part B, supra). 
Both the red flashlight and the "55 mph sucks" button 
should have been suppressed because they were not listed on the 
warrant as items to be seized. They were seized in a sweeping 
search which went well beyond the limitations set forth in the 
warrant. Furthermore, several other items were seized during the 
search which were not listed on the warrant (T. 69-70). However, 
prior to trial the prosecutor in the case stipulated to the 
suppression of all of those items on the very grounds now advanced 
— that the officers seized items not listed in the warrant (T. 
69-70). Clearly, if some non-listed items warranted suppression, 
then all non-listed items warranted suppression. Once the 
prosecutor stipulated to the partial suppression, the trial court 
should have ordered a total suppression of all non-listed items. To 
do otherwise defies logic. 
E. THE ADMISSION OF ANY ILLEGALLY SEIZED 
EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT. 
The appellant sought to exclude all material seized in the 
illegal search based on insufficient probable cause for the search. 
The trial court excluded only certain items, because those items 
were not listed as items to be seized in the search warrant, but 
rejected Appellant's probable cause argument. The Appellant 
contends that the trial court's error in refusing to suppress all 
evidence seized was prejudicial to the appellant at trial. 
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), this Court 
stressed that it may reverse a conviction when the trial court erred 
in admitting evidence, and the error is such that: 
there exists a reasonable probability or 
likelihood that there would have been a result 
more favorable to the defendant in absence of the 
error. 
Id. at 1352. See also State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 310 (Utah 1979) and 
cases cited therein. 
The appellant's conviction was based on two aspects of the 
State's case: (1) the victim's identification of William Babbell, 
and (2) the evidence seized from the Babbell residence and 
vehicles. Had the latter been suppressed, there would have been a 
reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable to Mr. Babbell. 
The victim's description of her assailant was, in several 
significant ways, inconsistent with Mr. Babbell's appearance. She 
had described her assailant as being 5'11" (T. 154), having dark 
black hair (T. 154), straight bottom teeth (T. 156), having no 
moustache (T. 160), and having normal strength and movement in his 
right arm (T. 177). But Mr. Babbell is 6'3n (T. 288), has sandy 
brown hair and a moustache, has a front lower tooth missing (T. 
157), and has very limited strength and movement in his right arm 
due to an industrial accident (T. 285). (For an extended discussion 
of these inconsistencies, see Point II). 
The State's case was further weakened by the Appellant's 
alibi defense. The victim testified that her assailant released her 
and she began walking out of the canyon at about 7:00 a.m., (T. 
182). The appellant's mother, Florence Babbell, testified that 
William's truck was in the driveway at 6:00 a.m. when she awoke (T. 
302). She woke William, who was sleeping in his bed, sometime 
between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. (T. 303). 
Given these weaknesses in the state's case (for further 
elaboration, see Point II), there can be no doubt that the case was 
made significantly stronger by the admission into evidence of the 
"55 mph sucks" button and the knife which was identified as the 
assault weapon. In Appellant's Point II it is argued that had these 
items been suppressed, there would have been insufficient evidence 
to base a verdict of guilt. But even if this Court does not agree 
with that position it cannot reasonably be argued that the Appellant 
was not prejudiced by the improper admissions of the seized items. 
Therefore, had the illegally seized items been suppressed, a 
reasonable likelihood exists that a more favorable result would have 
been reached. 
POINT II 
HAD THE ILLEGALLY SEIZED PROPERTY BEEN SUPPRESSED, 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WOULD HAVE BEEN INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY VERDICT, 
A reviewing court has the authority to review a case on the 
sufficiency of the evidence. In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444 
(Utah 1983), this Court stated, ". . . notwithstanding the 
presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this Court still has 
the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict." This Court then stated the standard to be applied: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence [viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict] is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
Id. 
William Babbell's convictions were based principally on two 
aspects of the state's case: (1) the victim's identification of 
William Babbell, and (2) the evidence seized illegally from the 
Babbell residence and vehicles. Mr. Babbell contends that had the 
illegally seized evidence been excluded (Point I) the evidence 
presented would have been insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. 
Had the seized evidence been excluded, the State's case 
would have rested on the strength of the victim's identification of 
William Babbell. However, the victim's description of the assailant 
was, at best, of very questionable accuracy. Therefore, had the 
illegally seized evidence been excluded, the State's case would have 
been significantly weakened. 
The victim testified that her assailant was S'll11 (T. 154), 
had dark black hair (T. 154), straight bottom teeth (T. 156), and 
had no moustache (T. 160). But the appellant, William Babbell, is 
6 '3" (T. 288), has sandy brown hair and a moustache, and has a front 
lower tooth missing (T. 157). Furthermore, Mr. Babbell has tatoos 
on his hand and both upper legs which are large and noticeable (T. 
293), but which were never described by the victim, even though she 
had repeated opportunities to notice these peculiarities. Yet she 
never identified her assailant, before or at trial, has having any 
unusual tatoos. 
The victim further described her assailant as being strong, 
with no noticeable weakness in either arm (T. 177). But Dr. Robert 
Hansen, the Babbell family doctor, testified that Mr. Babbell had 
suffered a recurrent dislocation of his shoulder in an industrial 
accident five years earlier (T. 282-283), resulting in a nerve 
injury to the brachial plexus, the nerves running from the neck to 
the arm. The consequence of this injury, as well as a February, 
1985 injury to Mr. Babbell was that Mr. Babbell suffered from 
stiffness of the right hand, as well as persistent weakenss and 
limitation of movement in his right arm and shoulder (T. 285). Dr. 
Hansen had referred Mr. Babbell to a neurosurgeon and neurologist 
for possible rehabilitative surgery (JEcL) . Yet, despite the fact 
that the victim testified that her assailant used force on her, she 
testified that she did not notice any lack of strength in his right 
hand or arm, and she did not notice any injury to her assailantfs 
hand (T. 177). 
Further adding to the weakness of the victim's 
identification of Mr. Babbell was Mr. Babbell's alibi defense. The 
victim testified that her assailant released her at approximately 
7:00 a.m. (T. 181). She was certain of the time because dawn was 
commencing (T. 182). But Florence Babbell, the appellant's mother, 
testified that William Babbell's truck was parked in the driveway 
when she woke up at 6:00 a.m. (T. 302). She woke the appellant 
sometime between 6:30 and 7:00 so that he could help his sister 
jump-start her car (T. 303). 
Certainly the jury's function is to access credibility, and 
in so doing, the jury may disregard alibi testimony. However, if 
the illegally seized evidence had been suppressed as it should have 
been, the jury could not have reasonably disregarded the extensive 
inconsistencies between the victim's description of her assailant 
and Mr. Babbell's appearance. Had the seized evidence been 
suppressed, no reasonable juror could have found Mr. Babbell guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt given the remaining evidence presented. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant William 
Babbell seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of his case to 
the District Court with an order for either dismissal of the charges 
or a new trial. \^  
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ADDENDUM A 
IN* THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTS, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) : ss 
Count}* of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: Micheal Burton 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) in the vehicleCsl described as 1971 Chevrolet pickup 
truck, License #MK3127, dark brown in color 
[X) on the premises known as 8558 South 3830 West writh a 
white camper located in the driveway; and the house at 
the same address, a white and brown mobile home which 
is not presently mobile 
In the City of West Jordan, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now certain propertv or evidence described as: 
1. Small revolver, snub-nose type 
2. Hunting knife, with approximately 6n blade 
3. Wondra Lotion 
4. Large M a c k flashlight 
5. Wallet, maroon in color, velcro fastner, containing credit cards 
and identification of Karen Sine 
6. Clothing consisting of white short-sleeved O.P. Brand T-shiFt,v 
blue baseball cap 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
Affiant believes the propertv and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of Aggravated Sexual Assault, Aggravated 
Kidnapping, Aggravated Robbery. 
PAGE TWO 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH V,ARRV:i 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
are : 
Your affiant, Detective Larry Cazier, Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office, has been employed by the Sheriff' s^  Office for thirteen years 
and has been assigned to the Sex Crin;r\ Unit for two years, and 
bases this request for a search warrant upon the following: 
1) A statement by Karen Sine that on April 18, 1985, at about 5:00 
a.m. she was in Millcreek Canyon with 3 other individuals when she 
was approached by a person who identified himself as a narcotics 
officer and asked her to come with him. Once inside his vehicle, 
she was taken to a different location where she was sexually 
assaulted and was deprived of her wallet by the suspect. 
Karen Sine described the interior of the vehicle as having orange 
seat covers, a ^cracked windshielf, beverage holdjers ~on the 
dashboard , a_^L5.S1-:mph_sucksJr button on the dr i3:er^^_"sid_e_ vi sor, and a 
cassette play~er in ""the dashboard. 
T he_.._! o t h e r ind i y i_d_u aJLs who _ s_aw __ tji e vjl _c t_i m 1 e a_v e with the suspect, 
Lisa Jenkins, Jack Mover, and Alfonso Ulibarri, describe _jLhe triick 
as a jplder model Chevrolet 4-wheel dri ve pi ck-up, dark brown in 
color, with no front or rear bumpers. 
Based on the modus operadi of the suspect and the description of the 
suspect, Det. Virgil Johnson,- Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, 
believed the vehicle may belong to William Babbel. The detectives 
drove by the address of the suspect, 8558 South 3850 Kest, anc 
noticed a truck in the dr? '.'ewav_ tha t_ matched___t_he_d_e^cr ip t i on. The 
suspect's mother, aT^TesTd"e nt aT the address, gave tTfe<a"e tect i ve< 
permission to look at the truck. 
The suspect's mother stated that the suspect resides both in The 
camper located in the driveway and inside the residence previously 
described. 
The victim, Karen Sine, reports that during sex acts forced upon he' 
by the suspect, he used V.ondra lotion, which he obtained from th< 
glove box. She also described^ a, 6^_.huntj_ng knife, and a _smal 
revolver, the both of which suspect placed behind the seat of th 
pickup truck. She further described his clothing as _bei ng a whi t 
shojtj"_sl_e_eved_ O.P. __J)rand T-Shi r_t"and"3 'as"'hihT' "ha ving _wore .a _blu 
baseball cap. She aTs'o sTated the suspect deprived her of he 
marooTT^w^TetT^Vi th a velcro fastener, containing her i dent i f icat io 
and credit cards. The suspect used a large black poiice-typ 
flashlight during the commission of the offenses. 
I- ' r.i T U T r: 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the 
seizure of said items: 
(X) in the day time. 
SU ESCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ^ ^ d a y of April, 1985. 
^LcM^S^^rMiZ 
JIJD\E 
IN TH"E FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
l" i(;; f : ' - f lkcun. u>UK'i 
IN AND FOR SALT L'i.i. COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me b 
Officer Larry Cazier, I" arn satisfied that there is probable cause t 
believe 
That (X) in the vehicle'(s) described as 1971 Chevrolet picku{ 
truck, License #MK3127, dark brown in color 
(X) on the premises known as 8558 South 3830 West with 
white camper located in the driveway; and the house a 
the same address, a white and brown mobile home whic 
is not presently mobile 
In the City of West Jordan, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah 
there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
]. Small revolver, snub-nose type 
2 . Hunting knife, writh approximately 6M blade 
3. Kondra Lotion 
4 . Large black flashlight 
5. Wallet, maroon in color, -velcro fastner, containing credit card 
and identification of Karen Sine 
6. Clothing consisting of white short-sleeved O.P. Brand T-shirt 
blue baseball cap 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired 
(X) consists of an item or 
conduct, possessed by a 
You are therefore commanded: 
C X) in the da}' time 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s 
vehicle(s), and premises for the- herein-above described property < 
or is unlawfully possessed; 
constitutes evidence of i11eg a 
party to tin illegal conduct; 
A<T TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
evidence and if you find the sarn? or any part thereof,, to bring it 
forthwith before me at the Fifth Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, 
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to 
the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this S ' ' day of April, 1985. 
/ / y *•--• /Y^C /:JJ 
^ S / ^ T<<: I 
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8PC0FE C. WELLS ' = 3 4 ?.L ' 
Salt Lake Legal Defen-v^ r Assoc 
Attorney for Defendant 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah S-1111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
AUG i 0 1385 
H Oiv^n Y\'r,f\\z^' r | o , k 3rd 0;st Cot 
i\v :^.^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY SIEZED 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case Nos.VO*-85-843^and 
CR-85-844 
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS 
COMES NOW the defendant, WILLIAM BABBELL, by and through his 
counsel of record, BROOKE C. WELLS, and moves for an order suppressing 
all evidence seized as a result of a search or searches executed at 855! 
South 3830 West, West Jordan, Utah and precluding introduction of such 
evidence at defendant's trial. 
Evidence seized at this address was taken in violation of 
defendant's state and federal constitutional rights. 
DOTED this -/ da y of August, 1983. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant 
NOTICE OF [I EAR IMG 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY ,M!Q THE CLEi r OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you pleass take notice that the above entitled 
matter will come on regularly for hearing on the 19th day of September 
1985 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Scott Daniels. 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this jCJ day of August, 1985% 
^l^-^Yt? CyO^Ol£^ 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
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